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What is Android?
• mobile OS based on a Linux 2.6 kernel
• initially developed by Google, later by the Open 
Handset Alliance (OHA)
• open source (Apache license) since oct 2008
‣ some drivers for special mobile hardware are still not free
• official supported platform is ARM
‣ but there is a port for x86 platforms
• Dalvik VM
‣ register-based VM for Java
• still growing (online-)community
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What is Android? (technical view)
source: http://www.techflare.com.au/media/102-android%20-%20system-architecture.jpg
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Malware on smartphones
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• interesting topic
• paper „Android: Next Target?“
‣ Schmidt et al
• smartphones getting more and more popular
• 2 main categories of attacks:
‣ direct attacks, e.g. bypassing permissions system
‣ indirect attacks, e.g. information leakage
• users doesn‘t realize that most smartphones are 
like normal desktop PCs
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Common counteractive measures on Android
• each application process is separated in an own 
sandbox-like environment
• strict permissions system
‣ you have to explicitly grant permissions before installing the application
• all applications have to be signed
‣ but signatures do not need to be certified by a trustworthy organization
• there are some Anti-Virus applications on the 
market
‣ but just signature based detection
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Problems on Android Security
• ability of using the Java Native Interface (JNI) to 
speed-up applications
‣ bypass SDK restrictions and normal application lifecyle
‣ Google provides NDK (Native Development Kit)
• rising amount of Applications for „rooted“ Android 
phones
‣ this applications could have COMPLETE control over the mobile device (root access)
• ability to access internal Android packages via 
reflection
‣ access on not officially supported API content
• Security on Android is an issue!
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• Android Application Sandbox
‣ Use-Cases
‣ Design
‣ Conclusion
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Use-Cases for AAS
(i) Application Provider (e.g. Android Market)
• detect malware to prevent submission to the market
• improve techniques for Anti-Virus Software
(ii) User
• wants to know what the Application is exactly doing on the phone
• e.g. access personal data although App didn‘t have the permission
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Design of the AAS
10
SIDAR Spring 2009 Android Application Sandbox
Design of the AAS
10
APK
SIDAR Spring 2009 Android Application Sandbox
Design of the AAS
10
APK
AndroidManifest.xml
SIDAR Spring 2009 Android Application Sandbox
Design of the AAS
10
APK
AndroidManifest.xml
classes.dex
SIDAR Spring 2009 Android Application Sandbox
Design of the AAS
10
APK
AndroidManifest.xml
classes.dex
Ressources
pictures
layout.xml
libraries (.so)
...
SIDAR Spring 2009 Android Application Sandbox
Design of the AAS
10
APK
AndroidManifest.xml
classes.dex
Ressources
pictures
layout.xml
libraries (.so)
...
AndroidManifest.xml
classes.dex
SIDAR Spring 2009 Android Application Sandbox
Design of the AAS
10
APK
AndroidManifest.xml
classes.dex
Ressources
pictures
layout.xml
libraries (.so)
...
static
analysis
SIDAR Spring 2009 Android Application Sandbox
Design of the AAS
10
APK
AndroidManifest.xml
classes.dex
Ressources
pictures
layout.xml
libraries (.so)
...
static
analysis
V ( {1,0} )1
SIDAR Spring 2009 Android Application Sandbox
Design of the AAS
10
APK
AndroidManifest.xml
classes.dex
Ressources
pictures
layout.xml
libraries (.so)
...
static
analysis
V ( {1,0} )1
Android
Emulator
SIDAR Spring 2009 Android Application Sandbox
Design of the AAS
10
APK
AndroidManifest.xml
classes.dex
Ressources
pictures
layout.xml
libraries (.so)
...
static
analysis
V ( {1,0} )1
Android
Emulator
- install
- exec
- random input
SIDAR Spring 2009 Android Application Sandbox
Design of the AAS
10
APK
AndroidManifest.xml
classes.dex
Ressources
pictures
layout.xml
libraries (.so)
...
static
analysis
V ( {1,0} )1
Android
Emulator
- install
- exec
- random input
SIDAR Spring 2009 Android Application Sandbox
Design of the AAS
10
APK
AndroidManifest.xml
classes.dex
Ressources
pictures
layout.xml
libraries (.so)
...
static
analysis
V ( {1,0} )1
Android
Emulator
V ( {1,0} )2
- install
- exec
- random input
SIDAR Spring 2009 Android Application Sandbox
Design of the AAS
10
APK
AndroidManifest.xml
classes.dex
Ressources
pictures
layout.xml
libraries (.so)
...
static
analysis
V ( {1,0} )1
Android
Emulator
V ( {1,0} )2
- install
- exec
- random input
? !
SIDAR Spring 2009 Android Application Sandbox
Design of the AAS (2)
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• first step done via ‚disassemble‘ and ‚grep‘
‣ disassemble of .dex file with baksmali (http://code.google.com/p/smali/)
• second step, LKM which hijacks some syscalls
‣ LKM acts like a rootkit
‣ logging of syscall usage into logfile which will be analysed after execution time
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Conclusion / Thesis
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• 2 step analysis
‣ Does the result of the static analysis imply the result of the dynamic analysis ?
• first step really fast
• second step very expensive
• consider the 2 Use-Cases! (User/AppMarket)
‣ Do you always need the 2 steps or just one of them, and if so: which one ?
• to prove thesis I need a lot of applications
‣ Problem: Google AppMarket closed source, no direct access, only via mobile phone
‣ I wrote a robot which has downloaded ~150 APKs for researching :)
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• Summary
‣ Future work / Bibliography
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Future Work
• better reverse engineering of mobile applications
• real-time malware detection on smartphones
‣ anomaly detection possible with AAS, but actually not in real-time!
• Android Honeypot
‣ Honeynet
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